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In this paper we are concerned with assessing the cohesiveness of a 
society whose individual preferences are known. We analyse the 
axiomatic properties of a general proposal to measure aggregate 
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Consider the case of a finite society that must express its preferences on a finite list of 
alternatives (or more generally, that aggregates its members’ preferences into a social preference 
on the alternatives). In this paper we are concerned with the aggregate welfare that the profile of 
preferences brings about to this society. We analyse the axiomatic properties of a proposal to 
measure such satisfaction that intends to capture the consensus that a social preference by a 
representative agent furnishes. Under this position the informational basis of the model (all 
personal preferences on the alternatives) must bear comparison with the informational structure 
of the social representative.  Two preliminary remarks on our model are in order.  For one thing, 
our procedure to measure the consensus (relative to the social benchmark) is in line with 
previous analyses like e.g., Bosch (2005) or Alcalde and Vorsatz (2010) where an absolute 
coefficient is sought.  For another, and concerning what an “ideal” focal agent could be, much 
has been written about the (un)suitability of aggregation rules thus any possible choice will raise 
criticisms. Therefore in order to set forth the virtues of our model we expound on the normative 
properties of a general  class of measures where the  idea of a fictitious representative agent is 
captured by select voting rules. 
The literature has provided several studies of metrics producing distance measures for pairs of 
individual preferences  expressed  by binary  relations  (cf., e.g., Kemeny, 1959; Kendall, 1962; 
Cook and Seiford, 1978, 1982; Klamler, 2008; Baldiga and Green, 2011). Concerning groups of 
individuals we can address to the  aforementioned Bosch (2005) and Alcalde and Vorsatz 
(2010), and our objective resembles theirs in that we consider finite groups of agents too. But we 
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must emphasize from the outset that we separate from their positions in a critical point:  in the 
frequent situations where individual preferences are formed in order to make a collective 
judgement, a measure  of the cohesiveness of preferences as a social welfare function must  
relate  to  the  output that they  might  generate. To see this, suppose for example the case where 
pairwise collective comparisons are made on a unanimity basis (i.e., in order for “x” to be 
socially better than “y” all agents must agree that “x” is better than “y”). Then in a large group 
voting on two alternatives “x” and “y”, if all members except one agree that “x” is better than 
“y” but one member thinks  the opposite it is intuitively appealing  that an absolute measure of 
the consensus à-la-Bosch should  yield  a  high  value  although the social welfare that the  
preferences  actually  warrant seems negligible.  So under a welfarist point of view we cannot  
detach the possibility of a collective outcome from the configuration  of the preference  profile. 
Our goal is shaped by these constraints. We present the concept of referenced consensus  
measures which permit to produce a numerical  social evaluation from purely  ordinal  
individual  information.  It  can be specialized via two ways:  the specification of the 
representative agent, and the measure of agreement between profiles of orderings  and  
individual  orderings.   Then  we perform  a descriptive analysis of their formal properties  with 
an emphasis on two relevant cases whose explicit constructions are detailed1 . Our proposal does 
not intend  to be univer sally applicable  but  we stress  that introducing  a fictitious  agent as a 
reference is fit for the case of actual  social choices. 
The  paper  is organized  as follows.  Section  2 introduces  basic notation and definitions. 
Furthermore in this  section,  our proposal  of measurement of consensus,  the  referenced  
consensus  measure,  is introduced  as well as a relevant particular subclass of referenced 
consensus measures,  the normal  referenced consensus measure.  In Section 3, operational 
characterizations of some focal voting rules  are  provided,  which helps  us to  deal  with  the  
two explicit  proposals  for measurement of consensus that we present.  Also we perform a short  
analysis  of the  dichotomous  case.  In Section 4 we explore a list of appealing  properties  of 
normal  referenced  consensus  measures,  and  particularly of our explicit  proposals.  Finally,  
in Section  5 we give some concluding  remarks  and  pose questions for further  research. 
 
2 Basic notation and definitions 
 
We fix },...,{= 1 kxxX , a finite set of k  options, alternatives or candidates. Abusing notation, 
on occasions we refer to option sx  as option s  for convenience. A population of agents or 
voters is a finite subset }{1,2,...,= NN  of natural numbers. We also denote 





Let )(XW  be the set of weak orders or complete preorders on X , that is, the set of complete 
and transitive binary relations on X . If )(XWR  is a weak order on X  that reflects the 
preferences of a voter, then by jk xRx  we mean “R-voter thinks that alternative kx  is at last as 
good as jx ”. )(XL  denotes the set of linear orders on X . 
A profile )(....)(),,(= 1 XWXWRR
N
N R  is a vector of weak orders, where 
)(XWRi   represents the preferences of the individual i  on the k  alternatives or candidates 
for each Ni ,1,=  . The  reversal of the profile R , denoted by 1R , is the profile 
),...,( 111

NRR  where sittis xRxxRx 
1  for each possible voter },{1, Ni   and 





Any permutation   of the voters }{1,2,..., N  determines a permutation of R  by 
),......,(= )((1) NRR 
R . Similarly, any permutation   of the candidates }{1,2,..., k  
determines a permutation of every complete preorder )(XWR  via 
)(1)(1 tistis
xRxxRx  
  for all },{1,, kts   and },{1, Ni  . Then with R  and 
  we can associate ),......,(= 1 NRR
 R . 
Finally, given any profile of weak orders NN XWRR )(),,(= 1 R  and any weak order R  
on X , we denote R R  the profile ),,,( 1 RRR N   of 1N  weak orders. We denote by 
)(XP  the set of all profiles, that is, N
N
XWX )(=)(
1 P . 
 
2.1  Basic definitions 
 
We start by recalling some definitions from Alcantud, de Andrés, Cascón (2011). 
 
Definition 1 A Consensus measure with reference to a consensus function (henceforth, 
referenced consensus measure, RCM for simplicity, when the consensus function is common 




1. C  is a consensus function (McMorris and Powers, 2009), that is, a mapping  
 
),()(: XWX PC  
 
 that associates a complete preorder )(RC  with each profile of complete preorders R . 
We speak of the  consensus preorder )(RC  associated with R , and assume that  
 
a) R=)(RC  for each profile R  that is constant to the complete preorder R . 
b) )(=)( RCRC   for each profile of complete preorders and   permutation of 
the voters. 
c) )(=)( RCRC   for each profile of complete preorders and   permutation of 
the candidates or alternatives. 
Abusing notation, this can be replaced with a  voting rule with suitable properties: for 
example, )1.b  and )1.c  just mean the usual anonymity and neutrality conditions, 
respectively. 
 
2.   is a referenced measure function (RMF), that is, a mapping  
 
[0,1],)()(:  XWXP  
 
that assigns a real number, [0,1]),(  RR , to each pair of a profile of complete 
preorder R , and a complete preorder R , with the following properties: 
 
a) 1=),( RR  if and only if R  is constant to R . 
b) ),(=),( RR RR    for each possible permutation   of the voters. 
c) ),(=),( RR RR    for each possible permutation   of the candidates.  
 
With regard to ),(= CM  each profile of complete preorders R  on X  has a consensus 
))(,(=)( RCRR M . 
 
Each conventional consensus measure can be interpreted as a referenced consensus measure 
(Alcantud, de Andrés, Cascón, 2011, Lemma 1). For this reason it is analytically convenient to 
restrict ourselves to a significant proper subclass where a better normative behaviour can be 
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guaranteed. To that purpose Alcantud, de Andrés and Cascón (2011) introduce the following 
concept: 
 
Definition 2 A referenced consensus measure ),(= CM  is called normal referenced 
consensus measure if its referenced measure function   verifies 
 
2.d) 0>),( RR  if RR . 
 
If overall satisfaction is an aggregate of individual satisfaction, property )2.d  can be considered 
as natural. 
In order to check the profiles of individual preferences against the social benchmark, the 
following general proposal is exploited: 
 
Definition 3  Let M  be a consensus measure. Given a profile of complete preorders R  and a 
complete preorder R  we define the )(Mp -reference measure function ( )(Mp -RMF) as the 




















  RMRM  (1) 
 
It is trivial to check that properties )2.a , )2.b , )2.c  and )2.d  hold true.  
 
This parametric format can be specialized via p  and the consensus measure. In particular, we 
conclude this part with the important example of referenced measure functions given by the 
arithmetic mean and Kemeny’s measure: 
 
Example 1  For every profile of complete preorders ),,(= 1 NRR R , its  Kemeny’s measure 
)(RK  is the probability that the binary ordering between a pair of randomly selected 
alternatives is the same for all voters. Given 1=p  and KM = , the construction above 
produces the following RMF. Attending to (1), we have to compute the Kemeny’s measure of a 
profile composed by two elements: iR  that represents the preferences of individual i  and R  the 
referenced complete preorder. Observe that there is a total of 
2
1)( kk
 possible random 
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Convention 1  In what follows we omit superscripts when they are 1. We denote the )(1 K -
RMF as K .  
 
Along the rest of the paper we restrict our attention to normal referenced consensus measure with 
referenced measure function based on generalized means. 
 
3  Some proposals for normal referenced consensus measures 
 
In this section we detail the construction of two relevant normal RCM proposals. These models 
check the profiles against the classical Borda and Copeland methods, that we proceed to recall, 
and they measure the consensus with the )(1 K -RMF. 
 
Example 2  A tie-breaking Borda rule (Suzumura, 1983, pp. 107-108) attaches a complete 
preorder to each profile of complete preorders. It ranks the candidates according to their 






s xRxXxxRxXxx   
Because )1.a , )1.b  and )1.c  are immediate, we denote by BC  such consensus function. 
If in fact we have a profile of linear orders the same ranking is obtained through the alternative 










Example 3  The Copeland method (Saari and Merlin, 1996; Suzumura, 1983, p. 108) ranks the 
candidates according to their respective Copeland score defined as follows:  
.}..:{#.}..:{=#)( mssbyxbeatsxXxmssbyxbeatsxXxx stttsts   
where s.s.m. stands for “strict simple majority”. This rule is widely used in tournament 
situations, and versions of it are adopted by sports leagues. Again, )1.a , )1.b  and )1.c  are 
immediate. We denote by CC  its associated consensus function.  
 
We proceed to provide operational characterizations of the Borda and Copeland rules. We then 
describe our proposals and briefly discuss the dichotomous case. 
 
3.1  Some operational characterizations 
 
Let us fix a profile ),...,(= 1 NRRR  of complete preorders on X . Its Borda and Copeland 
scores can be reinterpreted in terms of simple matrix operations. We denote by tA  the transpose 
of the matrix A . For any nm  real-valued matrix nmjiaA )(= ,  the notation )(Asig  refers 
to the nm  matrix whose ),( ji  cell is 1 if 0>, jia , 1  if 0<, jia , and 0 otherwise. kI  
denotes the identity matrix of size kk  . 
For each complete preorder sR , the asymmetric part of which is denoted by sP , its preference 
matrix sP  is defined as the kk   binary matrix whose ),( ji  cell is 1 when jsi xPx , and 0 
otherwise. Observe that sR  is linear if and only if kkk
t
ss I  (1)=)(PP , the constant to 1 
matrix of size kk  . The sum of the cells in the i -th row of tss )(PP   is 
}:{#}:{# isjjjsij xPxXxxPxXx  . We say that R  has an aggregate preference 
matrix NPPA  ...=)( 1R . Its ),( ji  cell has the number of agents for which alternative ix  
is strictly better than jx . The sum of the cells in its i -th row is the usual Borda score )( ix  
when R  is a profile of linear orders. 
 
Define t))(()(=)( RRR AAA  , then the sum of the cells in its i -th row is )( ix , the 
Borda score of alternative ix  (see Example 2).  
Observe that the fact that the ),( ji  cell of )(RA  is greater than 0  is equivalent to the fact that 





RR AΑ sig  then the sum of the cells in its i -th row is )( ix , the Copeland score of 
alternative ix  (see Example 3).  
 
Example 4  Suppose },,,{= wzyxX  thus 4=k . Let ),,(= 321 RRRR  be the profile of 
































































= 321 PPP  
















































=)( RRR ΑAA  
Thus for this setting the Borda and Copeland scores coincide throughout. Their values are 1  
for options x  and y , and 1 for options z  and w . Therefore the social preference R  that is 
derived from both choice rules is yIxPzIw  (Suzumura, 1983, p. 108). 
 
Calculating ),( RRK  for ),...,(= 1 NRRR  profile of complete preorders and R  complete 
preorder is trivial from the numbers )(, RRi
ts K . These amounts can be computed with the 
assistance of basic matrix manipulations too. Denote by P  the preference matrix of R  defined 
as above. Let us observe two facts. 
1. Cell ),( ts  of both tii )(PP   and 
tPP   has a 0  if and only if both iR  and R  are 
indifferent between sx  and tx . This can not happen when ts   if either iR  or R  is 
linear. 
2. Cell ),( ts  of both iP  and P  has a 1 if and only if tis xPx  and ts xPx .  
This means that the number of pairs of different options for which both iR  and R  are 
indifferent is the number of cells strictly above the diagonal with a 0  for both tii )(PP   and 
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tPP   (and it is 0  if either iR  or R  is linear); and the number of pairs of options for which 
iR  and R  have equal strict preference is the number of cells (outside the diagonal) with a 1 for 
both iP  and P
2











   KK K . 
 























ttt PPPPPP  
because all 1P , 2P  and 3P  are linear orders. The preference matrix of the complete preorder R  
































 RRK  since  
 No pair of different options is indifferent under any of the iP ’s.  
 Only cells (4,1)  and (4,2)  have a 1 in both 1P  and P . 
 Only cells (3,1) , (3,2) , (4,1)  and (4,2)  have a 1 in both 2P  and P . 
 Only cell (3,2)  has a 1 in both 3P  and P .  
 
3.2  The RCM-B and RCM-C proposals 
 
The referenced consensus measure given by the tie-breaking Borda rule (cf., Example 2) and K  
introduced in Example 1 is referred to as RCM-B, that is, ),(= KBC BM . Let us now show 







Example 6  In the situation of Example 4 we checked that )(RCB  is the complete preorder BR  
determined by yIxPzIw BBB . According to Example 5 
18
7
=))(,(=)( RCRR BK BM  





 possible pairwise comparisons made by a member of the 
society {1,2,3}  coincide with the binary ordering given by the consensus function in the model. 
 
The referenced consensus measure given by the Copeland method (cf., Example 3) and K  is 
referred to as RCM-C, that is, ),(= KCC CM . The following example illustrates its 
calculation. 
 
Example 7  In the situation of Example 4 (see Example 6) we found BR=)(RCC  thus 
18
7
=))(,(=)( RCRR CK CM  
Again, 7 out of 18  possible pairwise comparisons made by a member of the society {1,2,3}  
coincide with the binary ordering given by the consensus function in the model.  
 
3.3  The case of a dichotomous choice 
 
Suppose 2=k , i.e., the dichotomous case. To simplify notation let },{= yxX . We also 
denote |}:{=|1 yPxin iN  and |}:{=|2 xPyin iN , thus 
.|}:{=|21 yIxinnN iN  Due to properties )1.b  and )2.b  we can reorder the voters 
as convenient, and we assume that voters 11,..., n  prefer x  strictly over y , that voters 
211 1,..., nnn   prefer y  strictly over x , and that the last 21 nnN   voters are indifferent 
between x  and y . Let )(, Ryxn  denote the majority margin of x  over y  under R , that is, the 
number of voters that prefer x  strictly over y  minus the number of voters that prefer y  strictly 
over x , or 21, =)( nnn yx R . Now the Borda and Copeland voting rule coincide with strict 





































































































































This means that under either RCM-B or RCM-C, total lack of consensus only happens under a 
precise fifty-fifty division among all the voters (half prefer x  strictly over y , half the other way 
around), which is commonly agreed upon (see e.g., Alcalde and Vorsatz, 2008, pp. 2-3). 






























and an odd number of voters can not produce zero consensus under these models. 
 
4 Normal referenced consensus measures: a critical analysis of their properties 
  
In this Section, ),(= pMC M  denotes a normal referenced consensus measure with a )(M
p -
RMF. In other words, pM  is based on a conventional consensus measure M  and is computed as 
a p -generalized mean according to (1). We proceed to check that such a model agrees with 
certain axioms that are in common use in the literature. At this point we remark that Axioms 1 to 
3 below hold true in the larger class of referenced consensus measures. Finally, a critical analysis 
of other  ad-hoc properties is performed. 
 
4.1  Some properties of referenced consensus measures 
  
The following axiom is trivial from the definition of a referenced consensus measure. It means 
that maximum consensus is reached under commonly held preferences across agents. 
 
Axiom 1  M  is  unanimous if for each constant profile R  it is true that 1=)(RM .  
 
Similarly, Proposition 1 below proves that the following property obtains: 
 
Axiom 2  M  is  anonymous if for each permutation of the voters   and each profile R , it is 
true that )(=)( RR MM  .  
 
As is apparent, anonymity of a normal referenced consensus measure means that the consensus 
measure does not change if we rename the voters. 
 
Proposition 1  Any M  is anonymous.  
 









In particular, both RCM-B and RCM-C satisfy Axiom 2. We now argue that normal referenced 
consensus measures verify the following property too: 
 
Axiom 3  M  is  neutral if the consensus measure does not change when we rename the 
candidates.  
 
Proposition 2  Any M  is neutral.  
 
Proof. From properties )1.c  and )2.c  we obtain  
).(=))(,(=))(,(=))(,(=)(
)1.)2.




In order to introduce a further property of normal referenced consensus measures, we first give 





m RRRRRRR  
that we call an m -replication of the profile R . Then we say that the consensus function C  
verifies  replication if )(=)( RCRC m  throughout. This means that for each fixed society, the 
same consensus ordering is proposed if we repeatedly clone it. Likewise we define: 
 
Axiom 4  M  verifies the  replication axiom if for each profile R  and Nm  it is true that 
)(=)( RR mMM  .  
 
Coupled with Axiom 2, this property is the analogue of the replication axiom in Alcalde and 
Vorsatz (2008) 3. They interpret it as an invariance property asking that exact replications of a 
society are attached the same level of coherence as the original. The following result checks the 
model under inspection against Axiom 4: 
 








Proof. Let us fix a profile ),...,(= 1 NRRR  and Nm . By definition of R
m , it is clear that 






































































Thus because C  satisfies replication we finally obtain 
).(=))(,(=))(,(=)( RRCRRCRR MM MM 
pmpm  
□ 
Corollary 1  Both RCM-B and RCM-C verify the replication axiom.  
 
Proof.  By Proposition 3 it suffices to prove that both Borda and Copeland rankings satisfy 
replication. Let us fix a profile ),...,(= 1 NRRR  and Nm . We observe that because 
)(=)( RR AA mm  and )(=)( RR AA mm  the Borda ranking is preserved by m -





RRRR mmsigsig ΑAAΑ  implies that the Copeland ranking is 
preserved by m -replication of the profile.  
□ 
The next Axiom captures the intuitively appealing property that the consensus measure should 
not change if all the agents simultaneously reverse their orderings of the alternatives: 
 
Axiom 5  M  verifies reversal invariance if the reversal of any profile R , namely 1R , 
produces the same consensus, i.e., 
.)(=)( 1 RRR profilepossibleeachfor MM  
 
To discuss this property, we have to introduce some additional notations. A consensus function 
C  satisfies the  reversal property if 11 )(=)(  RR CC  for any complete peorder R . This 
means that when all voters in a profile reverse their rankings of the candidates then the outcome 
is reversed. A consensus measure M  verifies the  reversal property if )(=)( 1 RMRM   for any 
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profile of complete preorders. That is, the consensus measure is unchanged when the profile is 
reversed. Let us analyse this property in detail. 
 
Proposition 4  Given ),(= pMC M , if C  and M  verify the reversal property, then M  
satisfies the reversal invariance axiom.  
 
Proof.  Since 111 )(=))((   RCRC ii RR , by hypothesis we infer for all Ni 1=  that  
)),((=))((=)))(((=))(( 11111   RCMRCMRCMRCM iiii RRRR  
 and thus from definition of )(Mp -RMF we conclude as follow  





Our particular proposals in Section 3 verify this property too.  
 
Corollary 2  Both RCM-B and RCM-C verify the reversal invariance axiom.  
 
Proof.  Because the Borda and the Copeland rules satisfy the reversal property (Saari and 
Merlin, 1996, Section 1) we only have to prove that Kemeny’s measure verifies the reversal 
property. This is straightforward since ))((=))(( 11,,   RCKRCK i
ts
i
ts RR  for each 
possible voter i  and candidates s  and t .  
□ 
We now investigate if normal referenced consensus measures verify the following  
reinforcement property: 
 
Axiom 6  M  verifies  reinforcement if adding )(RC  to the profile R  does not reduce the 
consensus, i.e., 
.)())(( RRCR profilepossibleeachforR MM   
 
We proceed to state a criterion for satisfaction of this property that depends upon the behavior of 
C , and then we check that RCM-B meets such criterion but RCM-C does not. We say that a 
consensus function C  verifies  decision invariance if )(=))(( RCRCRC   for each profile 
R . This means that the consensus ordering does not change if we add to the society a new agent 




Proposition 5  Given ),(= pMC M , if C  verifies  decision invariance then M  verifies 
reinforcement.  
 





























































where the last inequality derives from the fact 1 )(  RM . Such inequality becomes strict 
provided 1<)(RM .  
□ 
 
In Proposition 6 below, an appeal to Proposition 5 permits us to prove that RCM-B verifies 
reinforcement. Remark 1 below shows that the Copeland rule does not verify decision 
invariance4.  
 
Proposition 6  RCM-B verifies reinforcement.  
 
Proof. We just need to prove that the Borda rule verifies the decision invariance property which 
in conjunction with Proposition 5, proves the assertion. Let us take the profile R  and denote 
)(= RCBBR  with preference matrix BP . Recall that for 
t))(()(=)( RRR AAA  , the sum 
of the cells in its i -th row is )( ix , the Borda score of alternative ix . We claim 
)(=))(( RCRCRC BBB  . These orders arise from the respective Borda scores, namely B  
and  , obtained from ))(( RCR BA  and )(RA  by summing up the cells in their rows. 
Observe tBB )()(=))(( PPAA  RRCR B . By construction )()( ji xx    if and 
only if jBi xRx . Because the sum of the cells in the i -th row of 
t
BB )(PP   is 






the cells in the i -th row of tBB )(PP   is greater or equal than the sum of the cells in the j -th 
row of tBB )(PP  . This proves our claim )()( jBiB xx    if and only if )()( ji xx    
throughout.  
 
Remark 1  The Copeland rule fails to verify the decision invariance property. Consider the 
profile R  of Example 4, then the Copeland rule provides the preorder R  such that wIzPxIy . 
For the profile RR , the preorder R  that is prescribed by the Copeland rule is 








































































=)( RandR RR ΑA  
This means )())(( RCRCRC CCC  .  
 
In order to prove another interesting property of a suitable subclass of normal referenced 
consensus measures we need some previous elaboration. The consensus function C  verifies 
responsiveness if for every )(XWR   and NXW )(R , the following equality holds 
eventually (i.e., for all sufficiently large m ):  
RRR
m
 =)...(RC  (2) 
We proceed to prove that the Borda rule and the Copeland rule verify a restricted version of this 
property, namely restricted responsiveness: for every )(XLR   and NXW )(R , equation 
(2) holds eventually. 
 




Proof. We fix },...,{= 1 kxxX , )(XLR  , and 
NXW )(R . 
Firstly we analyse the Borda rule. Given ts xx   we can assume ts xPx   without loss of 
generality. Now irrespective of the Borda score that R  attaches to them –namely, )( sxR  and 
)( txR – it must be the case that for sufficiently large m  the Borda score with respect to 
RR
m
m  ...= RR  –which we denote by mR – is strictly higher for sx , since 
)()()()( tstmsm xxmxx RRRR    
If 0m  is such that 0> mm  implies 0>)()( ts xxm RR    then 0> mm  implies that the 
ordering between sx  and tx  according to RR
m
m  ...= RR  coincides with its ordering 
according to R . Because there are finitely many pairs in K , this conclusion can be 
simultaneously reached for every pair ts xx   of elements in X . 
We now analyse the Copeland rule. Given ts xx   we can assume ts xPx   without loss of 
generality. It is clear that for sufficiently large m  the alternative sx  beats tx  by strict simple 
majority according to RR
m
m  ...= RR . Formally: denote by   the Copeland score of 
the profile with the linear order R  only, and by m  the Copeland score of the profile 
mR , then 
)(>)( ts xx    and it is eventually true that )(=)(>)(=)( tmtssm xxxx   . Now the 
argument goes through as above.  
□ 
 
Responsiveness can not be guaranteed in Lemma 1: even in the simplest non-trivial instance 
where there are two candidates both the Borda rule and the Copeland rule fail to be responsive as 
the next example shows. 
 
Example 8  Suppose },{= yxX  thus 2=k . Let )(= 1RR  be the profile of one linear order 
given by yPx 1 . We also let R  be the complete preorder with yIx  , which is not a linear 
order. Then 1=)...(=)...( RRRRR
mm
 RCRC CB  for each m , that is, both 
the Borda and Copeland methods suggest the consensus ordering RR 1 . The reason is that 
irrespective of m , the Borda score of x  is a unit higher than the Borda score of y , and the 
Copeland score of x  is 1 but the Copeland score of y  is 0 .  
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We are now ready to define: 
 








Axiom 8  M  verifies  restricted convergence to unanimity if for every )(XLR   and 
NXW )(R , 1=)...(lim RR
m
m  RM .  
 
We proceed to elucidate to which extent normal referenced consensus measures verify 
convergence to unanimity, with an especial attention to the RCM-B and RCM-C cases. 
 
Proposition 7  Given ),(= pMC M , if C  is responsive (resp., restrictedly responsive) then 
M  verifies Axiom 7 (resp., Axiom 8). In particular, RCM-B and RCM-C verify restricted 
convergence to unanimity.  
 
Proof.  Suppose C  is responsive, that is, for every )(XWR   and NXW )(R  the 
equality RRR
m









































































 where we are using that 1=)( RR M  and 1 ),(  Rp RM . 
 
The case of a restrictedly responsive consensus function is proved analogously. In particular, 
Lemma 1 ensures that RCM-B and RCM-C verify restricted convergence to unanimity.   
□ 
 
We now investigate the relationship between the consensus of two parts of the society and the 
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consensus of the entire society. It is easy to show that our general model does not verify the 
following very demanding property: when the population is divided into two (or more) groups 
with the same consensus, the overall consensus is also the same. In order to better link the 
consensus of different groups we just need that they select the same collective preference. In this 
case we can prove that the overall consensus should be a magnitude in between the minimun and 
the maximun consensus of the parts, a property called compensativeness (see Grabisch et al., 
2009): 
 
Axiom 9  M  verifies  compensativeness if for every pair of profiles R  and 'R  with 
)'(=)( RCRC  it is true that  
)}.'(),({max )'( )}'(),({min RRRRRR MMMMM   
 
To analyse this property it is convenient to introduce the following concept. A consensus 
function C  is consistent if: R , 'R  are such that )'(=)( RCRC  implies 
)'(=)(=)'( RCRCRRC  . Proposition 8 below checks our model against Axiom 9. 
 
Proposition 8   If C  is consistent then ),(= pMC M  verifies Axiom 9.  
 
Proof.  Let NXW )(R  and NXW  )('R  be two profiles satisfying )'(=)( RCRC . 


























































Using this equality, it is straightforward to show  
}.)'(,)({max )'( })'(,)({min ppppp RRRRRR MMMMM   
Finally, we conclude by monotonicity of the function pxxf 1/=)( .  
□ 
 
Now Proposition 9 below proves that the RCM-B proposal verifies compensativeness, and 
Remark 2 below proves that the Copeland rule is not consistent.  
 




Proof. We just need to prove that the Borda rule is consistent, which in conjunction with 
Proposition 8, proves the assertion. Let NXW )(R  and NXW  )('R  be two profiles with 
)'(=)( RCRC BB . We observe that because )'()(=)'( RRRR AAA   the Borda scores 
satisfy  
.),()(=)( '' Xxallforxxx iiii  RRRR   
 Since )'(=)( RCRC BB  the scores R  and 'R  rank the alternatives in the same way. 
Observe that the sum of these scores '' = RRRR    also produce the same ranking. 
Therefore we deduce )'(=)'(=)( RRCRCRC BBB  .  
□ 
 
Remark 2  The Copeland rule fails to satisfy the consistency property. Suppose 
},,{= 321 xxxX  thus 3=k . Let ),,,,(= 54321 RRRRRR  and ),,(=' 876 RRRR  be 






Some simple computations yield that both )(RCC  and )'(RCC  are the indiference preorder 
zIyIx . Under consistency the consensus function CC  on profile 'RR  would associate the 
same indifference preorder. However )'( RRCC   is the linear order for wich yPxPz . 
 
Remark 3  If a consensus function C  satisfies the consistency property then C  verifies 
replication and decision invariance.  
 
The following Axiom 10 is a weaker version of Axiom 9. It claims that if the society is 
composed by groups with the same collective opinion and consensus, then the overall consensus 
does not change. 
 
Axiom 10  M  verifies  quasi-consistency if for every pair of profiles R  and 'R  with 
)'(=)( RCRC  and )'(=)( RR MM   it is true that  




It is clear that RCM-B verifies quasi-consistency, because in particular Proposition 8 assures that 
if C  is consistent then ),(= pMC M  verifies Axiom 10. 
 
4.2  On other requirements of referenced consensus measures 
  
The literature on measurement of consensus has dealt with other desirable properties that we 
briefly analyse in this Subsection. Axiom 11 below requests that null and full consensus are 
possible. 
 
Axiom 11  M  verifies  full range if there are two profiles R  and R  such that 0=)(RM , 
1=)(RM .  
 
Neither RCM-B nor RCM-C verify this property in the sense that zero consensus is impossible 
for particular values of N  as seen in Subsection 3.3. 
Similarly, we proceed to analyze the property of Monotonicity, whose formal definition is given 
in Alcalde and Vorsatz (2008). Intuitively it say as follows. Suppose that you measure the 
consensus in a society. Now one agent reverses her/his opinion about the ordering of one 
particular pair of alternatives only5. If the alternative that the agent favours after the change beats 
the other alternative in a pairwise comparison  for the rest of the society then the consensus 
should increase. And if both alternatives tie in a pairwise comparison  for the rest of the society 
then the consensus should not vary after the change. 
Examples 9 and 10 below show that RCM-B does not verify any of the two statements that 
jointly define Monotonicity. The same goes for Examples 11 and 12 regarding RCM-C.  
 
Example 9  Suppose },,{= zyxX  thus 3=k . Let ),,(= 321 RRRR  be the profile of linear 
orders given by: zPxPy 11 , zPyPx 22 , xPzPy 33 . Then )(RCB  is 1P , that is, the Borda 





Consider the profile ),,(= 321 RRRR  where 1R  is the linear order xPzPy 11  . Under 








 because )(RCB   
                                                            
5
  Observe that this excludes from the analysis the case of a reversal of the order between  x  and  y  e.g., in  xPzIy 11  or in 
xPzPy 11 . These reversals modify the ordering between other pairs of alternatives too.  
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is the complete preorder R  for which zIxPy  .  
 
Example 10  Suppose },,{= zyxX  thus 3=k . Let ),,(= 321 RRRR  be the profile of 
linear orders given by: zPxPy 11 , yPxPz 22 , xPzPy 33 . Then )(RCB  is 3P , that is, the 





Consider the profile ),,(= 321 RRRR  where 1R  is the linear order xPzPy 11  . Under 






)(RCB   is the complete preorder R  for which xPzIy  .  
 
Example 11  Suppose },,{= zyxX  thus 3=k . Let ),,(= 321 RRRR  be the profile of 
linear orders given by: zPyPx 11 , zPxPy 22 , xPyPz 33 . Then )(RCC  is 2P , that is, the 





Consider the profile ),,(= 321 RRRR  where 1R  is the linear order yPzPx 11  . Under 





 because )(RCC   
is the complete preorder R  for which zIyIx  .  
 
Example 12  Suppose },,{= zyxX  thus 3=k . Let ),,,(= 4321 RRRRR  be the profile of 
linear orders given by: zPyPx 11 , zPyPx 22 , yPxPz 33 , yPxPz 44 . Then )(RCC  is the 







Consider the profile ),,,(= 4321 RRRRR  where 1R  is the linear order whose asymmetric 






 because )(RCC   is the complete preorder R  for which 




5 Related literature and concluding remarks 
  
We conclude our paper with the following comments on our approach to this controversial topic 
and related literature6.  
1. We have explored the normative properties of a general class of measures of the 
cohesiveness in a society. The standard tendency in this regard reflects the intention to 
produce an absolute coefficient of consensus, and to supply their axiomatic 
characterizations. Neither of those possible indices are banned by our general concept 
of a referenced consensus measure. The normality property permitted us to restrict 
ourselves to a wide framework where many desirable properties of a measure of 
cohesiveness ensue. We have made an extensive discussion of properties with a 
particular attention to the analysis of societies that are divided into disjoint parts that 
produce the same collective decision; here and elsewhere we concluded that the Borda 
benchmark permits a much better aggregative behavior than Copeland. Besides, our 
model reconciles the measurement of magnitudes of (dis)agreement of preferences with 
social choice theory in the vein of earlier works like: Kemeny (1959), who proposes a 
social welfare ordering that maximizes the probability of agreement with a randomly 
selected member of the group; Baigent (1987), who shows that social welfare functions 
that verify certain proximity preservation property cannot both respect unanimity and be 
anonymous (see also Baigent, 1989; Nitzan, 1989; Klamler, 2005), who started 
comparing the Copeland rule to other aggregation procedures explicitly based on 
distance information; Meskanen and Nurmi (2006), who study how classical social 
welfare functions relate to distance functions between rankings and profiles; or 
Kemeny’s generalization by Baldiga and Green (2011) and to a lesser extent, Klamler 
(2008) more general approach by choice functions, among others. 
 
2. Alcalde and Vorsatz (2010) criticize the abuse of the intuitive approach by mean 
aggregators of pairwise individual comparisons of similarity. The bulk of their 
argument is that it is restrictive because it casts aside important information that only 
the whole preference profile captures, as Example 1 in Alcalde and Vorsatz (2010) 
appears to show. Our approach does not disregard that intuitive approach but we believe 
that it partially circumvents such supposed handicap for two reasons. For one thing, 
because it contrasts personal preferences with a social target and this can collect the 
global information of the profile. Let us consider their example, where },,{= zyxX  







orders: zPyPx 11 , zPyPx 22 , xPzPy 33 . They argue that cohesiveness should be 
higher at the following profile P  than at P : zPyPx 11 , yPzPx 22 , zPxPy 33 . 
Indeed some simple computations yield )(=0.55>0.77=)( PP
BB MM
 . For 
another, they claim that a weakly higher weight has to be given to objects that are more 
important at the social level. Because Definition 3 relies on generic consensus measures 
it can be designed so as to prioritize the socially relevant alternatives as well as to 
gather global information of the profile. This indicates that some route of escape that 
does not reject the intuitive original approach can be found. 
 
3. Our informational input is a profile of complete preorders, a more general framework 
than the usual linearity requirement where ties are not allowed. Specific welfare rules 
have been studied. Other possibilities come to mind immediately. For example, the 
appeal to choice functions as in Klamler (2008), or in other terms the use of other focal 
aggregation rules to obtain the social objective. Links can be drawn between these 
possibilities since for example, easy correspondences can be made between approval 
voting and its generalizations (Brams and Fishburn, 1992; Laslier and Sanver, 2010) 
and choice functions. 
 
4. We do not advocate for the universal adequacy of our model. However the question that 
a measure of the cohesiveness of personal preferences is a convenient tool for the 
analyst has been exploited in Alcantud, de Andrés and Cascón (2011). There we 
compare the performance of the Borda and Copeland voting rules for small numbers of 
alternatives. A computational analysis reveals that an ex-ante advice on the rule that 
should be adopted can be made in the wake of the chances that one rule produces higher 
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